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hugo/config/security/securityConfig_test.go
T
Bjørn Erik Pedersen 79f030be5b config/security: Add "! " negation to Whitelist, harden default http.urls 
Whitelist now treats any pattern prefixed with "! " (the same negation
prefix used by hglob/predicate) as a deny rule. Deny matches take
precedence over allow, and a whitelist made up exclusively of deny
rules implicitly allows everything it does not deny.

The default security.http.urls now reads:

    urls = ['(?i)^https?://[a-z]', '! (?i)localhost', '! @']

i.e. allow URLs whose host starts with a letter (the common
"https://example.com" shape), deny anything that looks like localhost,
and deny URLs with userinfo to foil "http://user@127.0.0.1/" bypasses.
Public IP literals are collateral blocks; users who need them (or their
own private hosts) override security.http.urls as before, mixing allow
and deny rules with the same "! " prefix, e.g.

    [security.http]
    urls = ['.*', '! ^https?://evil\.example\.com']

Fixes #14792
2026-04-22 20:15:19 +02:00

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// Copyright 2018 The Hugo Authors. All rights reserved.
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
package security
import (
"testing"
qt "github.com/frankban/quicktest"
"github.com/gohugoio/hugo/config"
)
func TestDecodeConfigFromTOML(t *testing.T) {
c := qt.New(t)
c.Run("Slice whitelist", func(c *qt.C) {
c.Parallel()
tomlConfig := `
someOtherValue = "bar"
[security]
enableInlineShortcodes=true
[security.exec]
allow=["a", "b"]
osEnv=["a", "b", "c"]
[security.funcs]
getEnv=["a", "b"]
`
cfg, err := config.FromConfigString(tomlConfig, "toml")
c.Assert(err, qt.IsNil)
pc, err := DecodeConfig(cfg)
c.Assert(err, qt.IsNil)
c.Assert(pc, qt.Not(qt.IsNil))
c.Assert(pc.EnableInlineShortcodes, qt.IsTrue)
c.Assert(pc.Exec.Allow.Accept("a"), qt.IsTrue)
c.Assert(pc.Exec.Allow.Accept("d"), qt.IsFalse)
c.Assert(pc.Exec.OsEnv.Accept("a"), qt.IsTrue)
c.Assert(pc.Exec.OsEnv.Accept("e"), qt.IsFalse)
c.Assert(pc.Funcs.Getenv.Accept("a"), qt.IsTrue)
c.Assert(pc.Funcs.Getenv.Accept("c"), qt.IsFalse)
})
c.Run("String whitelist", func(c *qt.C) {
c.Parallel()
tomlConfig := `
someOtherValue = "bar"
[security]
[security.exec]
allow="a"
osEnv="b"
`
cfg, err := config.FromConfigString(tomlConfig, "toml")
c.Assert(err, qt.IsNil)
pc, err := DecodeConfig(cfg)
c.Assert(err, qt.IsNil)
c.Assert(pc, qt.Not(qt.IsNil))
c.Assert(pc.Exec.Allow.Accept("a"), qt.IsTrue)
c.Assert(pc.Exec.Allow.Accept("d"), qt.IsFalse)
c.Assert(pc.Exec.OsEnv.Accept("b"), qt.IsTrue)
c.Assert(pc.Exec.OsEnv.Accept("e"), qt.IsFalse)
})
c.Run("Default exec.osEnv", func(c *qt.C) {
c.Parallel()
tomlConfig := `
someOtherValue = "bar"
[security]
[security.exec]
allow="a"
`
cfg, err := config.FromConfigString(tomlConfig, "toml")
c.Assert(err, qt.IsNil)
pc, err := DecodeConfig(cfg)
c.Assert(err, qt.IsNil)
c.Assert(pc, qt.Not(qt.IsNil))
c.Assert(pc.Exec.Allow.Accept("a"), qt.IsTrue)
c.Assert(pc.Exec.OsEnv.Accept("PATH"), qt.IsTrue)
c.Assert(pc.Exec.OsEnv.Accept("e"), qt.IsFalse)
})
c.Run("Enable inline shortcodes, legacy", func(c *qt.C) {
c.Parallel()
tomlConfig := `
someOtherValue = "bar"
enableInlineShortcodes=true
[security]
[security.exec]
allow="a"
osEnv="b"
`
cfg, err := config.FromConfigString(tomlConfig, "toml")
c.Assert(err, qt.IsNil)
pc, err := DecodeConfig(cfg)
c.Assert(err, qt.IsNil)
c.Assert(pc.EnableInlineShortcodes, qt.IsTrue)
})
}
func TestToTOML(t *testing.T) {
c := qt.New(t)
got := DefaultConfig.ToTOML()
c.Assert(got, qt.Equals,
"[security]\n enableInlineShortcodes = false\n\n [security.exec]\n allow = ['^(dart-)?sass(-embedded)?$', '^go$', '^git$', '^node$', '^postcss$', '^tailwindcss$']\n osEnv = ['(?i)^((HTTPS?|NO)_PROXY|PATH(EXT)?|APPDATA|TE?MP|TERM|GO\\w+|(XDG_CONFIG_)?HOME|USERPROFILE|SSH_AUTH_SOCK|DISPLAY|LANG|SYSTEMDRIVE|PROGRAMDATA)$']\n\n [security.funcs]\n getenv = ['^HUGO_', '^CI$']\n\n [security.http]\n methods = ['(?i)GET|POST']\n urls = ['(?i)^https?://[a-z]', '! (?i)localhost', '! @']\n\n [security.node]\n [security.node.permissions]\n allowAddons = ['tailwindcss']\n allowRead = ['.']\n allowWorker = ['tailwindcss']\n allowWrite = []\n disable = false",
)
}
func TestDecodeConfigDefault(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
c := qt.New(t)
pc, err := DecodeConfig(config.New())
c.Assert(err, qt.IsNil)
c.Assert(pc, qt.Not(qt.IsNil))
c.Assert(pc.Exec.Allow.Accept("a"), qt.IsFalse)
c.Assert(pc.Exec.Allow.Accept("node"), qt.IsTrue)
c.Assert(pc.Exec.Allow.Accept("npx"), qt.IsFalse)
c.Assert(pc.HTTP.URLs.Accept("https://example.org"), qt.IsTrue)
c.Assert(pc.HTTP.Methods.Accept("POST"), qt.IsTrue)
c.Assert(pc.HTTP.Methods.Accept("GET"), qt.IsTrue)
c.Assert(pc.HTTP.Methods.Accept("get"), qt.IsTrue)
c.Assert(pc.HTTP.Methods.Accept("DELETE"), qt.IsFalse)
c.Assert(pc.HTTP.MediaTypes.Accept("application/msword"), qt.IsFalse)
c.Assert(pc.Exec.OsEnv.Accept("PATH"), qt.IsTrue)
c.Assert(pc.Exec.OsEnv.Accept("GOROOT"), qt.IsTrue)
c.Assert(pc.Exec.OsEnv.Accept("HOME"), qt.IsTrue)
c.Assert(pc.Exec.OsEnv.Accept("SSH_AUTH_SOCK"), qt.IsTrue)
c.Assert(pc.Exec.OsEnv.Accept("a"), qt.IsFalse)
c.Assert(pc.Exec.OsEnv.Accept("e"), qt.IsFalse)
c.Assert(pc.Exec.OsEnv.Accept("MYSECRET"), qt.IsFalse)
c.Assert(pc.Node.Permissions.IsEnabled(), qt.IsTrue)
c.Assert(pc.Node.Permissions.AllowRead, qt.DeepEquals, []string{"."})
c.Assert(pc.Node.Permissions.AllowWrite, qt.DeepEquals, []string{})
}
func TestCheckAllowedHTTPURLHardenedDefaultsIssue14792(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
c := qt.New(t)
c.Run("Public URLs allowed by default", func(c *qt.C) {
c.Parallel()
pc, err := DecodeConfig(config.New())
c.Assert(err, qt.IsNil)
for _, u := range []string{
"https://example.org/",
"https://example.org:8443/foo",
"https://sub.example.org/path",
} {
c.Assert(pc.CheckAllowedHTTPURL(u), qt.IsNil, qt.Commentf(u))
}
})
c.Run("Private/loopback URLs denied by default", func(c *qt.C) {
c.Parallel()
pc, err := DecodeConfig(config.New())
c.Assert(err, qt.IsNil)
for _, u := range []string{
"http://localhost/",
"http://LOCALHOST:8080/",
"http://foo.localhost/",
"http://127.0.0.1/",
"http://127.1.2.3:8080/x",
"http://user:pass@127.0.0.1/", // userinfo must not sneak past the deny.
"http://10.0.0.1/",
"http://172.16.0.1/",
"http://192.168.1.1/",
"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/", // AWS/GCP metadata.
"http://0.0.0.0/",
"http://[::1]/",
"http://[fe80::1]/",
"http://[fc00::1]/",
// Public IP literals are blocked as collateral; users can override.
"http://93.184.216.34/",
"https://[2001:db8::1]/",
} {
err := pc.CheckAllowedHTTPURL(u)
c.Assert(err, qt.IsNotNil, qt.Commentf(u))
c.Assert(err, qt.ErrorMatches, `(?s).*is not whitelisted in policy "security\.http\.urls".*`, qt.Commentf(u))
}
})
c.Run("Explicit user config bypasses hardening", func(c *qt.C) {
c.Parallel()
tomlConfig := `
[security.http]
urls = ['http://127\.0\.0\.1.*', 'http://localhost.*']
`
cfg, err := config.FromConfigString(tomlConfig, "toml")
c.Assert(err, qt.IsNil)
pc, err := DecodeConfig(cfg)
c.Assert(err, qt.IsNil)
c.Assert(pc.CheckAllowedHTTPURL("http://127.0.0.1:8080/foo"), qt.IsNil)
c.Assert(pc.CheckAllowedHTTPURL("http://localhost:1313/"), qt.IsNil)
})
c.Run("User can deny with the ! prefix", func(c *qt.C) {
c.Parallel()
tomlConfig := `
[security.http]
urls = ['.*', '! ^https?://evil\.example\.com']
`
cfg, err := config.FromConfigString(tomlConfig, "toml")
c.Assert(err, qt.IsNil)
pc, err := DecodeConfig(cfg)
c.Assert(err, qt.IsNil)
c.Assert(pc.CheckAllowedHTTPURL("https://good.example.com/"), qt.IsNil)
err = pc.CheckAllowedHTTPURL("https://evil.example.com/x")
c.Assert(err, qt.IsNotNil)
c.Assert(err, qt.ErrorMatches, `(?s).*is not whitelisted in policy "security\.http\.urls".*`)
})
}
func TestDecodeConfigNodePermissions(t *testing.T) {
c := qt.New(t)
c.Run("Custom paths", func(c *qt.C) {
c.Parallel()
tomlConfig := `
[security.node.permissions]
allowRead = ["/tmp", "."]
allowWrite = ["."]
`
cfg, err := config.FromConfigString(tomlConfig, "toml")
c.Assert(err, qt.IsNil)
pc, err := DecodeConfig(cfg)
c.Assert(err, qt.IsNil)
c.Assert(pc.Node.Permissions.IsEnabled(), qt.IsTrue)
c.Assert(pc.Node.Permissions.AllowRead, qt.DeepEquals, []string{"/tmp", "."})
c.Assert(pc.Node.Permissions.AllowWrite, qt.DeepEquals, []string{"."})
})
c.Run("Disabled", func(c *qt.C) {
c.Parallel()
tomlConfig := `
[security.node.permissions]
disable = true
`
cfg, err := config.FromConfigString(tomlConfig, "toml")
c.Assert(err, qt.IsNil)
pc, err := DecodeConfig(cfg)
c.Assert(err, qt.IsNil)
c.Assert(pc.Node.Permissions.IsEnabled(), qt.IsFalse)
})
c.Run("Wildcard", func(c *qt.C) {
c.Parallel()
tomlConfig := `
[security.node.permissions]
allowRead = ["*"]
allowWrite = ["*"]
`
cfg, err := config.FromConfigString(tomlConfig, "toml")
c.Assert(err, qt.IsNil)
pc, err := DecodeConfig(cfg)
c.Assert(err, qt.IsNil)
c.Assert(pc.Node.Permissions.IsEnabled(), qt.IsTrue)
c.Assert(pc.Node.Permissions.AllowRead, qt.DeepEquals, []string{"*"})
})
}
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